6  Credibility and Reputation

6.1  Introduction

There is a differenc between the credibility of the policymaker and the policy it self. Institutional constraints - policy credible using gametheory as tool.

6.2  Reputation

Reputation, is the expectations which is formed through the showed past behavior. The interaction must be replaced to build reputation.

6.3  Reputation under complete Information

6.4  Reputation under Incomplete Information - Mimicking

The Backus-Driffill Model
Mimicking, play the role of an other typ, for example if the policymaker is weak he could try to play a though guy, and v.v..

6.5  Does Peputation "Solve" the Time-Consistency Problem?

6.6  Signaling

6.7  Reputation for not reneging on commitments

6.8  Credibility and External Circumstances

6.9  Ambiguity, Secrecy, And Imprecise Control

Cheap talk, an announcement which is made costless. If the interests of sender and receiver are correlated, there is no great incentive to lie.



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On 21 Oct 2005, 20:11.